## Journal Articles

2024 General Equilibrium and Dynamic Inconsistency (with Kirill Borissov and Ronald Wendner), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 114, 103024.

Abstract: We study the role of different sources of naivete in a general equilibrium version of the Ramsey model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. When agents are aware of others' naivete, as strongly suggested by empirical evidence, they revise consumption paths, correctly anticipating prices in a resulting sliding equilibrium (perfect foresight). When agents are unaware of others' naivete, as is typically assumed in the theoretical literature, they revise both consumption paths and price expectations (quasi-perfect foresight). We prove the existence of sliding equilibrium under perfect foresight for the class of isoelastic utility functions. We show that generically quasi-hyperbolic discounting matters for saving behavior: sliding equilibrium under perfect foresight is observationally equivalent to some optimal path in the standard Ramsey model only if utility is logarithmic. By comparing sliding equilibria under different types of foresight we show that perfect foresight implies a higher saving rate, long-run capital stock and consumption level than quasi-perfect foresight.

2023 Dissonance Minimization and Conversation in Social Networks (with Kirill Borissov and Mikhail Anufriev), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 215, pp. 167–191.

Abstract: We are examining social learning in networks, where agents aim to minimize cognitive dissonance resulting from disagreement by adjusting their statements in conversations to align with those of their associates, rather than truthfully sharing their beliefs. Our analysis investigates the impact of this adjustment, known as audience tuning, on belief revision, limiting beliefs, consensus conditions, and convergence speed. Our findings demonstrate that audience tuning facilitates extensive belief propagation beyond immediate associates, resulting in faster convergence in most of the societies considered. It also leads to a redistribution of influences on long-run beliefs, favoring agents with lower dissonance sensitivity. We also show that endogenous changes in the network, driven by dissonance minimization, can impede society from reaching a consensus.

2023 Economic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Discounting (with Kirill Borissov), Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, 63 (3), pp. 337–359.

Abstract: A survey of theoretical economic growth models with agents having different subjective discount factors is proposed. The structure of equilibrium paths in such models, their dynamics and convergence to stationary equilibria, and the relationship with Pareto optimal paths are described. Models with socially determined discount factors in which time preferences are formed endogenously are discussed, and the basic difficulties associated with social choice in the case of heterogeneous discount factors are examined. The models presented in the paper shed light on internal mechanisms of a market economy that lead to the division of society into the rich and the poor.

2023 Collective Choice with Heterogeneous Time Preferences, Journal of Economic Surveys, 37 (3), pp. 715–746.

Abstract: This paper reviews recent research on the aggregation of heterogeneous time preferences. Main results are illustrated in a simple Ramsey model with many agents with additively time-separable utility functions who differ in their discount factors. We employ an intertemporal view on this model and argue that preferences of a decision maker should be represented by a sequence of utility functions. This allows us to clarify the issue of dynamic inconsistency and relate it to simple properties of discounting. We distinguish between private and common consumption cases. In the private consumption case, we discuss the properties of sequences of additively time-separable social welfare functions and explain why the notion of Pareto optimality under heterogeneous time preferences becomes problematic. In the common consumption case, we focus on the problem of collective choice under heterogeneous time preferences, discuss the difficulties with dynamic voting procedures and review some ways to overcome them. We conclude by highlighting the implications of our discussion for the problem of choosing an appropriate social discount rate.

2018 Economic Growth and Property Rights on Natural Resources (with Kirill Borissov), Economic Theory, 65 (2), pp. 423–482.

Abstract: We consider two models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and agents heterogeneous in their time preferences. In the first model, we assume private ownership of natural resources and show that every competitive equilibrium converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium with the long-run rate of growth being determined by the discount factor of the most patient agents. In the second model, natural resources are public property and the resource extraction rate is determined by majority voting. For this model we define an intertemporal voting equilibrium and prove that it also converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium. In this scenario the long-run rate of growth is determined by the median discount factor. Our results suggest that if the most patient agents do not constitute a majority of the population, private ownership of natural resources results in a higher rate of growth than public ownership. At the same time, private ownership leads to higher inequality than public ownership, and if inequality impedes growth, then the public property regime is likely to result in a higher long-run rate of growth. However, an appropriate redistributive policy can eliminate the negative impact of inequality on growth.

2017 On Discounting and Voting in a Simple Growth Model (with Kirill Borissov and Clemens Puppe), European Economic Review, 94, pp. 185–204.

Abstract: In dynamic resource allocation models, the non-existence of voting equilibria is a generic phenomenon due to the multi-dimensionality of the choice space even if agents are heterogeneous only in their discount factors. Nevertheless, at each point in time there may exist a «median voter» whose preferred instantaneous consumption rate is supported by a majority of agents. Based on this observation, we propose an institutional setup («intertemporal majority voting») in a Ramsey-type growth model with common consumption and heterogeneous agents, and show that it provides a microfoundation of the choice of the optimal consumption stream of the «median» agent. While the corresponding intertemporal consumption stream is in general not a Condorcet winner among all feasible paths, its induced instantaneous consumption rates receive a majority at each point in time in the proposed intertemporal majority voting procedure. We also provide a characterization of stationary voting equilibria in the case where agents may differ not only in their time preferences, but also in their felicity functions.

## Publications (in Russian)

2023 Democratic Capital and Economic Growth in the Countries of the Third Wave of Democratization (with Roman Shapovalov), Journal of the New Economic Association, 58 (1), pp. 12–31.

2020 Human Capital in Economic Growth Theory: Classical Models and New Approaches (with Anna Bulina and Kristina Mozgovaya), St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, 36 (2), pp. 163–188.

2020 The Economics of Climate Change: William Nordhaus' Nobel Prize 2018, Finance and Business, 16 (1), pp. 5–22.

2019 Social Welfare in Growth Models with Heterogeneous Agents (with Kirill Borissov), St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, 35 (2), pp. 173–196.

2018 A Division of Society into the Rich and the Poor: Some Approaches to Modeling (with Kirill Borissov), Journal of the New Economic Association, 40 (4), pp. 32–59.

2016 Macroeconomics: Textbook for Undergraduate and Graduate Levels (with Kirill Borissov and Yulia Vymyatnina), Moscow, URAIT.